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 PHYLLIS VAN SLYCK
 Charting an Ethics of Desire in
 The Wings of the Dove
 Have you acted in conformity with your desire?
 Jacques Lacan
 We might say that the process of truth induces a subject.
 Alain Badiou
 1
 Why do philosophers and literary theorists consistently return to the ques
 tion of ethical behavior in Henry James, a writer who, as Lee Clark Mitchell
 recently observed, "resists any simple notion of human psychology or ethical
 engagement"?1 As we struggle to understand Isabel Archer's return to her disas
 trous marriage, Lambert Strether's commitment to the fantasy of Madame de
 Vionnet, Maggie Verver's agonized contemplation of a successfully imprisoned
 Amerigo, and Milly Theale's construction of a space in which she can hold on to
 her desire, we are riveted by the complexity of these characters' emotional and
 ethical responses. We return to James not only because his characters' dilemmas
 refuse simple resolutions (perhaps any resolution) but also because we experi
 ence the suffering and paradoxical triumph of those who pursue their desire to
 its most far-reaching conclusion. James's characters are nothing if not willful—
 and ultimately alone—in their quests. Like figures from ancient Greek drama,
 they demand everything and give up nothing, enacting Jacques Lacan's ethical
 claim that "the only thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground
 relative to one's desire."2 In doing so, these characters seem to call into question,
 or at least complicate, the Kantian categorical imperative and the ideal of disin
 terested action, offering a radical ethical alternative. James's characters enact, I
 will argue, an ethic of desire.
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 My intention here is not to reduce James's late novel to an ethical treatise but,
 rather, to retrieve it from a kind of situational relativism that has long been con
 sidered, from a humanist perspective, to be antithetical to ethics. A number of
 critics have suggested that James's protagonists engage, implicitly or explicitly, in
 unethical behavior, in what Sharon Cameron calls, for example, a "phenomenol
 ogy of domination" as they construct fantasies of others that match their private
 desires.3 In keeping with Lacan's purposeful antihumanism, I will argue in con
 trast that James's characters pursue their desires in a way that leads to the discov
 ery and enactment of a personal ethic, an ethic that challenges the illusory notion
 of the coherent subject.4
 Refusing to cede one's desire leads to an awareness of the void around which
 reality is structured, what Lacan frames as "the Real."5 For Alain Badiou, as for
 Lacan, our normal lives are structured around the repression of the Real, and
 access to our subjectivity can occur only through an essential encounter, an event
 that "punches a hole" in the "instituted knowledges of the situation."6 Badiou
 argues, following Lacan, that the individual emerges as an ethical subject by hold
 ing fast to the particular truth that arises from such an Event.7 This encounter
 offers a foundational moment for ethical action, because the individual who is
 wholly committed to her desire comes into being as a subject—not the illusory
 coherent subject of humanism, but the shattered subject who has encountered her
 finitude. Lacans and Badiou's grounding of ethical behavior in the emergence of
 subjectivity is especially relevant to James, for, consistently, as the characters of the
 late novels and tales pursue the beast in their respective jungles, they come to see
 that the promise of desire—personal fulfillment, coherence of the self—is an
 empty space.8 Why is confronting finitude the basis for an ethical position?
 Because it allows the individual to begin (to act) from a wholly subjective orienta
 tion, in opposition to "the reality that commands and regulates."9
 In The Wings oj the Dove, "the great smudge of mortality across the picture"
 that Milly apprehends almost from her first appearance on the scene may be
 understood as an intrusion of the traumatic Real,10 because it serves as a kind of
 rupturing event, "something which turns [her] symbolic universe upside down
 and leads [her] to reconfigure it."11 Milly's response to her death sentence con
 stitutes what James refers to in his preface as "the insurpassable activity of pas
 sionate, of inspired resistance."12 From the moment she gazes at the Bronzino
 and tells Lord Mark, "I shall never be better than this'" (144), Milly understands
 that she "must pay any price for access to desire," and that "the hero[ine] trem
 bles before nothing, especially not before the good of the other."13
 I propose that we imagine a series of ethical moves through a reading of The
 Wings of the Dove, borrowing Badiou's notion that poetry can assume certain of
 philosophy's functions: "at the very locus where philosophy falters a poem is a
 locus of language wherein a proposition about being... is enacted."141 suggest
 that we begin by reconsidering Socrates's question (as Martha Nussbaum so
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 beautifully framed it in her seminal philosophical discussion of The Golden
 Bowl15), "How shall we live?" from the point of view of the individual (or charac
 ter) who refuses to cede her desire. Perhaps more than any other character in
 James, Milly Theale enacts this ethic. Despite her seeming passivity, she is placed
 from the beginning of her story in a terrifying battle with her mortality, and she
 poignantly embraces the void upon which her subjectivity must be founded.
 Milly's emerging ethic, however, is not based solely on the fact of her imminent
 doom, but on the choices she makes in dealing with this knowledge—specifi
 cally, her decision to hold fast to her desire, fully aware of the way her every ges
 ture forces her to confront the intimate relationship between desire and
 mortality.16 Milly's ethic will also be explored in a broader sense as we examine
 the effect of her actions on her antagonists—actions that will create a moment of
 ethical rupture for them.
 II
 From the standpoint of traditional ethics, The Wings of the Dove has long been read
 as a study of desire and betrayal, as critics and philosophers from Millicent Bell
 to Robert B. Pippin have examined Kate Croy's and Merton Densher's violation
 of Milly Theale.17 Milly's "tragic beauty," her rueful acceptance of meanings
 imposed by others, and her "self-definition through opposition, resignation, or
 transcendence" have been thoughtfully explored.18 Her antagonists' failure to
 treat her as a subject has been contrasted to Milly's ethic of generous love, offer
 ing readers a neat binary between good and evil, but one that obscures the pow
 erful dimension of desire in shaping each of these characters' responses to their
 respective destinies.19 For Kate, for Densher, and for Milly, an ethical moment
 arises that forces the question, demands that they make a decision: to abandon
 all or to remain faithful to their desire. According to Alenka Zupancic, such an
 ethical moment "makes us ask, will I act in conformity with what threw me out
 of joint; will I be able to reformulate what has hitherto been the foundation of my
 existence?"20
 In this context, perhaps we have not fully seen Milly Theale: we have not
 understood the ethical nature of her position; that is, we have failed to grasp her
 insight into the power of desire, its capacity to help her imagine herself as a (shat
 tered) subject.21 Milly actively confronts her mortality in almost every scene, and
 she builds her ethic by seizing and holding fast to her desire in the face of its
 impossibility. Early in the novel, when Sir Luke Strett confirms her fear that she
 does not have long to live, Milly transforms her terror into an opportunity: "The
 beauty of the bloom had gone from the small old sense of safety—that was dis
 tinct: she had left it behind her there for ever. But the beauty of the idea of a great
 adventure, a big dim experiment or struggle in which she might, more responsi
 bly than ever before, take a hand, had been offered her instead" (162). In the days
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 following her doctor's revelation, Milly sees herself as entirely alone ("nobody in
 the world knew where she was") yet, paradoxically, at one with other "anxious
 wanderers" in this "grim breathing space" (163). Her connection to another
 tragic heroine who knows she is doomed may clarify the nature of her position.
 Like Antigone, Milly confronts a "catastrophe" that is already "determined" and
 she knows it.22 For Lacan, Antigone's ethical "splendour" emerges through her
 sustained commitment to her desire, even though she knows that "her race is run
 . . . that she advances toward nothing."23 If Milly enacts the allegory of sacrifice,
 that of the pharmakos or scapegoat who must be expelled, who must die for the
 community to heal, she transforms this ancient gesture into its postmodern
 counterpart, following desire beyond the limit until she enters the space in which
 it is purified, emptied of content; she becomes, thereby, a true "being for death."24
 On one level every character in The Wings of the Dove, quite convincingly,
 pursues his or her desire. But if Milly, like Antigone, remains true to her real
 desire, her antagonists, like Creon, pursue all that masquerades as desire but
 really reflects its suppression. Kate (with Densher reluctantly in tow) founds her
 notion of desire and fulfillment on a presumed fullness of being (a coherence) to
 be derived from the goods of the world: if she can acquire money and social sta
 tus (along with Densher), the void will be filled. But traditional ethics, as Lacan
 argues, substitutes what you are supposed to do for the truth of desire, and an
 ethic founded on "the order of power" and the "service of goods" can only result
 in self-betrayal.25 Just as Creon loses from the moment he places the well-being
 of the state before personal desire, from the moment that Kate confuses the goods
 of the world for her real desire (not only for Densher but, more deeply, for her
 incomplete self), she is lost. The point is not merely that Kate, like Creon, has sold
 out; it is that she believes the desire of the Other, represented, most forcefully, by
 Maud Lowder, has content: that it will make her whole.
 The desiring stance of each of the major characters in The Wings of the Dove
 is explicitly linked to this quest for wholeness, and in the opening chapters James
 shows how people may be led to misrecognize themselves through the lens of the
 social world. Each of the three major characters is initially "called into a picture"
 and caught in its trap:26 each, like Milly, is "photographed... framed and glazed"
 (155). Where Kate succumbs to this misrecognition and Densher is paralyzed by
 it, Milly discovers in the gaze of the world her own mortality and, through it, the
 source of her desire.
 In the novel's opening scene, Kate Croy examines her literal reflection in the
 glass over the mantel in her sister's lodgings and vows to make her beauty work
 for her: "If she saw more things than her fine face in the dull glass ... she might
 have seen that... she was not herself a fact in the collapse" (7). Kate sets out to
 become the powerful, coherent "self' she believes is essential for her to succeed
 as she imagines doing what her father has failed to do for the family: "the broken
 sentence, if she was the last word, would end with a sort of meaning" (7). But Kate
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 misses the connection between her own (self-) representational acts and those of
 her father, whom she condemns for his successful self-rendering: "the inhuman
 . .. perfect look" (8) that has enabled him to deal out "lies" (8).
 A mirror is also offered to Densher when he is invited to Mrs. Lowder's for a
 one-sided discussion of his relationship with Kate. And while he waits to see her,
 the language of her "house" speaks to him, offering him "a portentous negation
 of his own world of thought" (55). In response, he silently imagines how his jour
 nalistic skills might be used to undermine Mrs. Lowder's social and commercial
 success ("He would write about the heavy horrors that could still flourish ... in
 an age so proud of its short way with false gods" [54]). But when he faces her, he
 is quickly diminished by Maud's powerful gaze. Her silence (her refusal to engage
 with him in a discussion of Kate) is a "drawn blind"; "the great glaze of her sur
 face" denies him a representation (57). Yet the emptiness Densher experiences,
 his recognition of literal impotence (he finds himself "in the cage of the lioness
 without his whip" [ 54]), is important because it points to the void he must under
 stand as the essential emptiness that his desire masks.
 In contrast to her antagonists, from the outset Milly recognizes that the illu
 sion of coherence offered by the reflected image is a trap. In the Bronzino portrait,
 which Lord Mark takes her to see because it reminds him of her, Milly immedi
 ately perceives the way a socially sanctioned wholeness betrays its fundamental
 emptiness. The Bronzino shows Milly what she believes she desires, a "magnifi
 cent" completion, but the face of the woman in the portrait also contains what
 Lacan calls the "anamorphic blot"—that which "reflects our own nothingness in
 the figure of the death's head."27 In identifying with this image, Milly simultane
 ously sees the impossibility, but also the necessity, of her efforts to seize her desire.
 Unlike Kate and Densher, Milly recognizes the paradoxical truth that she must
 live as if her desire is realizable even though she knows it is not. The mirror Kate
 uses to define herself, Aunt Maud's withering gaze, through which Densher expe
 riences his emotional and ethical absence (his inability to defend his desire for
 Kate), and Milly's Bronzino, through which she recognizes the mortality of all
 desire, all of these "mirrors" expose the lie implicit in the struggle for coherence.
 For Kate, the mirror provides an illusion that she is too proud to recognize is no
 more than a mirage; it formulates for her a desire that is not her own but that she
 will cling to until she is thoroughly lost. For Densher, the emptiness of his own
 image reflected in Maud's gaze will force him to initiate his struggle, and as he
 charts his complicated course between Kate and Milly, he will construct contra
 dictory images that chart his self-betrayal until he understands his essential lack.
 But for Milly, the mirror offered by the Bronzino portrait reflects, insists that she
 see, the void that permeates existence. "Fastened to a dying animal," she con
 fronts her mortality in its purest form, and in recognizing the emptiness at the
 center of her desire, the fundamental impossibility of her dreams, she encounters
 her own fragile and permanently incomplete self.28
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 Ill
 Before his heroine is given a place on the stage, James introduces the ethical
 dilemma of those who are most tied to the world, what Lacan calls the "order of
 power."29 As Kaja Silverman explains, "What is determinative for each of us is not
 how we would like to see ourselves, but how we are perceived by the cultural
 gaze."30 We may infer from the way Kate is drawn ever more deeply into a com
 promising loss of "self' thatjames, like Freud and like Lacan, is deeply suspicious
 of the pathogenic nature of civilized morality. Even though Kate justifies her logic
 as she imagines retrieving her family name ("it was the name above all she would
 take in hand" [7]), Kate's pursuit of "fortune and honor" (5) shows the obvious
 dangers of an ethic tied to the cultural gaze. Like other notable Jamesian heroines
 (Isabel Archer and Maggie Verver), what Kate truly fears and avoids is, precisely,
 her desire. As Eve Sedgwick observes, "For all Kate's sharp decisiveness, she uses
 her high abilities to postpone, always, instead of expediting—where postpone
 ment means keeping her place in the circle of petticoats, the circuit of mediated
 desires."31 But just as Milly confronts the Bronzino, recognizing the death mask
 it imposes, Kate also discerns the self-alienation she is engaged in as she "learn [s]
 in every way to express the part... for the character she had undertaken" (217).
 However, in contrast to Milly, Kate represses her knowledge.
 Refusing to give up the money and position that her aunt promises, brack
 eting her feelings for Densher and forcing him to follow suit, Kate begins to sac
 rifice her desire. Evidence of the problematic nature of her worldly approach to
 ethics is offered as she justifies her goals according to a pseudo-utilitarian model:
 everyone benefits—Milly will have a piece of happiness, and Kate and Densher
 will have her money. Despite her avowal of love ("I engage myself to you forever
 ... I give you every drop of my life" [66]), at no point does Kate imagine the pos
 sibility of fulfillment through Densher alone—not in a world where "fortune"
 counts more than self-knowledge. James makes it clear from the beginning that
 Kate's ethics are compromised, that something has "tampered with her spring,"32
 and although her poignant awareness that she is being used renders her sympa
 thetic, James continues to emphasize the way she is consistently co-opted by
 those she condemns most. If Kate seems enraged at her family's fetishizing her as
 their only object of value ("I am on the counter when I am not in the shop win
 dow; in and out of which I'm thus conveniently, commercially whisked" [181]),
 she dutifully incorporates the values of these choral figures who urge her to auc
 tion herself, accepting—however ambivalently—her marketability as a valid
 path to the fulfillment of her desire.
 Despite her willfulness, her powerful energy, and her superficial control, Kate
 gradually becomes the perfect surface upon which the desires of others may be reg
 istered, and her efforts to shape her destiny are consistently undermined by her self
 representational acts.33 In one of the few moments of "truth" for Kate—when she
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 holds her own image up for critique—she warns Milly that she is not what she
 seems:" Oh you may very well loathe me yet!" (184). Although Kate quickly retreats
 from this moment of self-revelation, embracing Milly and becoming once again the
 heroine of the fairy tale Milly needs to believe in, Kate's facility in making this shift
 exposes the layered, ethically compromising function of self-representation for her:
 the reflected image continues to embody an escape from rather than a recognition
 of the fundamental "lack" that drives her desire. When Densher forces her to come
 to his rooms (threatening to leave Venice, and Milly, immediately if she refuses),
 Kate registers the distance she has traveled from him—and from her original desire.
 There is nothing in this moment for her: she agrees to come, not to please Densher,
 and certainly not for herself, but to force him to complete his task, to support the
 representation she has constructed to deceive Milly.
 But if Kate seems to believe in the promise of an ideal social self, she implic
 itly concedes what she has already lost ("The way to pity me, if that's what you
 want, is to believe in me" [450]), she tells Densher toward the end of the novel.
 Like Sophocles's Creon, as Lacan describes him, she has become "dead among the
 living," for she has "literally lost all other goods."34 Even Densher's final offer ("I'll
 marry you, mind you, in an hour" [457]) cannot alter Kate's decision: Milly's
 money, the excremental "gold," means more to her than the truth of her desire.
 The point is not so much that Kate violates the categorical imperative in her treat
 ment of Milly (one might even argue perversely that she does not: that we would
 all, if dying, like to receive the gift of love—even if it is an illusion); it is that she
 is no longer "herself'—actually or potentially. In the end, the house of mirrors
 and the social order it represents, is always an empty space—and Kate gradually
 discovers that she has ceased to be in the picture.
 However, toward the end of the novel, James simultaneously softens and
 complicates Kate's apparent coldness and calculation by returning her to her sis
 ter's "sordid" lodgings, where her story began, and where she is dealing with her
 father once again. Densher sees, ruefully, that while "he could have lived in such
 a place," Kate would never survive in surroundings that are "ugly to the point of
 being sinister" (430). In the end, Kate partially redeems herself, not because, with
 Densher, we feel "specially sorry for her" (430) but because she understands
 Milly. She may recognize, finally, that Milly's money will not make her whole; but
 her real insight comes from a deepening awareness of Milly's effect on Densher.
 When he refuses to read Milly's letter, she tells him, "You're afraid of all the truth.
 She died for you then that you might understand her" (456). In fact, Kate's under
 standing will be necessary for Densher's belated conversion to an ethic of desire.
 IV
 A good analyst might ask, since it is clear from the beginning that Kate is an impos
 sible choice, what is Densher doing with her? From an ethical perspective, critics
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 have focused on Densher's moral failure, his self-righteous projection of blame for
 Milly's death onto Lord Mark, his untenable distinction between actions and words
 (which even Kate in the end finds repellent), and his unconvincing conversion to
 Milly's love.35 Less attention has been paid to Densher's early recognition of the fun
 damental impossibility of his choice, confirmed not only by Aunt Maud's rejecting
 gaze but in numerous other instances of dissonance as he registers his incompati
 bility with Kate's world. Except for their one furtive meeting in Venice, Densher
 admits, ruefully, that he has no place to take his love; their early coming together
 on imagined ladders overlooking separate gardens (38) only underscores the
 impossibility of their ever uniting in the "real" world.
 How, then, does Densher conceive of his desire? From the beginning, he is
 the most conflicted figure in the novel: if he believes his desire is realizable if only
 Kate would come to her senses, he also gradually discovers that Kate's creative
 and perverse arrangement of their lives, her consistent deferral, is precisely that
 which defines his desire, enabling him to experience "the spark of conflict ever
 latent in the depths of passion" (199).36 When Densher gives in to Kate's demand
 that he pledge himself to her but deny it to the world and pursue Milly instead,
 he does so believing, paradoxically, that in this way he is being true to Kate: "Not
 to give away the woman one loved, but to back her up in her mistakes . . . that
 was perhaps chief among the inevitabilities of the abjection of love" (245). In
 response to Kate's inaccessibility, like the hero of a courtly love romance, Densher
 will submit to whatever test or demand his love sets for him. But the feminine
 object in the courtly love model is not only by definition inaccessible; she is also,
 according to Lacan, a metonymy for the Thing (das Ding)—"the object forever
 lost around which the subject and his desire revolve."37 The darkness she embod
 ies will gradually reveal the true nature of desire to Densher, its connection to his
 lack, his incompletion.
 When he succeeds in convincing Kate to come to his rooms in Venice, Den
 sher begins to understand this emptiness around which desire is constructed.
 Only after Kate has left Venice is Densher able to truly experience her presence:
 "It played for him—certainly in this prime afterglow—the part of a treasure kept,
 at home, in safety and sanctity, something he was sure of finding in its place when,
 with each return, he worked his heavy old key in the lock" (348). Densher sees,
 finally, that real fulfillment occurs not in the moment of passion (which is sup
 pressed, significantly, in the text) but in the moment of recollection that follows.
 In his private vigil he discovers that the real object of his desire is not the elusive
 Kate but, rather, the "hallucination of intimacy" (348), the fantasy of something
 he has always already lost. But another kind of Event or intervention will be nec
 essary for him to understand the connection between desire and loss; it will
 require Milly Theale.
 Although some critics feel that Densher's relationship with Milly is not suc
 cessfully realized, and it is true that his deepening feelings for her cannot be
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 squared with his asking Kate to marry him again in the novel's closing scenes,
 during the period Densher remains in Venice, he begins to see Milly as a subject.
 Milly's impossibility, a more final impossibility than that of Kate, facilitates the
 final turn where Densher will discover the meaning—and the ethics—of desire.
 Crossing the "threshold" into Milly's Venetian palace he sees "all the elements
 compose differently" (315), and he knows what he must do: he executes the task
 of "Hermes" (James's name for him in his preface),38 guiding Milly to the Under
 world. But Milly is now the "Lorelei" (also James's reference) who will draw Den
 sher into her pool, stifling other voices with her siren song: "The unexpected
 impression made by pure pale, exquisite Milly as the mistress of the grand old
 palace . . . this spectacle had for him an eloquence, an authority, a felicity for
 which... he had not consciously bargained" (316). When Milly approaches the
 "space" where Densher keeps his memory of Kate under lock and key (she asks
 if she may visit him in his rooms), she directly challenges Kate's supremacy.
 Although Densher hesitates, there is a powerful shift in his emotions as he offers
 Milly Kate's "place": "He felt himself smiling through a mist... his great scruple
 suddenly broke giving way to something inordinately strange.... 'You can come
 when you like'" (355). In this extraordinary moment of ethical "rupture," Den
 sher sacrifices Kate for Milly, dimly discerning, but not yet fully grasping what has
 taken place: his "symbolic universe" has been "turned upside down," and he now
 begins to reconfigure it.39
 In a private vigil (the reflective epiphany that is, everywhere, the moment of
 truth in James), Densher confronts the delicate and dangerous power of his own
 acts of representation, the fact that he has lied to Milly, even if only by silence and
 omission, and that he is now responsible for her: "He felt himself shut up in a
 room on the wall of which something precious was too precariously hung" (358).
 Ever so subtly, Densher's own identity has been incorporated into their exchange
 so that to betray Milly is now, also, to betray himself. Neither his early fantasy of
 successful textual intervention (when he imagines he will be able to write about
 and rise above Aunt Maud's "heavy horrors" and "false gods" [54]) nor his nos
 talgic imprisonment of Kate in his rooms have led him to a deeper understand
 ing of his desire. But the "melancholy music" (316) foreshadowing Milly's death
 anticipates the permanent loss that will become the real object of Densher's quest:
 when he sacrifices Milly's letter and renders her his permanently unattainable
 object of desire, he encounters his own incomplete self.
 V
 Of the three characters, it is Milly who pursues her desire with the greatest fidelity,
 in a way that transforms her antagonists, and perhaps her readers. From begin
 ning to end, Milly remains eerily separate, evincing a poignant grasp of the
 impossibility—and the necessity—of her desire. From the first moment we see
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 her, seated on a "precipitous" and "dizzy edge" (83) of an alpine path,40 Milly
 occupies a privileged ethical position. Even before she is confronted with the
 Bronzino, she reads her destiny in the collective gaze of the others: they "might
 almost terribly have suggested that her doom was to live fast" (106). In almost
 every reflective moment, she contemplates her absolute solitude: "no one in the
 world could have sufficiently entered into her state" (161); "no tie would have
 been close enough to enable a companion to walk beside her without some dis
 parity" (247). But where Kate, however willful, remains until the end an actress
 on the stage of Maud's (and her family's) desire and an image of Densher's impos
 sible longing (both positions in which she is the object of another's gaze), Milly
 pursues her desire to love and be loved in defiance of social realities she tacitly
 recognizes (Kate's relationship with Densher; the Lowder entourage's self
 absorbed use of her). Despite her seeming victimization, Milly is the most effec
 tive composer in the novel. Her innocent bedazzlement as she enters the London
 scene, seeing her surroundings, and even other people, as "touches in a picture
 and denotements in a play" (98), fails to conceal the way she shapes the contents
 of her picture according to her desire.
 Milly begins by imagining other characters as if they are there for her own
 private purpose and use. In her initial discovery of Kate, she engages in an objec
 tification that matches Kate's own tendency to use others for her private purpose:
 "She placed this striking young person from the first in a story, saw her for a hero
 ine" (114). From the outset, Kate is someone whom Milly will be able to define
 according to her fantasy: "Kate had, for her new friend's eyes, the extraordinary
 attaching property of appearing at a given moment to show as a beautiful
 stranger, to cut her connexions and lose her identity, letting the imagination for
 the time make what it would of them" (138). This subtly aggressive composi
 tional stance (not unlike Maggie Verver's in the second half of The Golden Bowl)
 expands in subsequent scenes as Milly becomes the object of Densher's desire by
 assuming Kate's identity, almost literally entering the physical and emotional
 space of her friend—in order to live (and to be loved), however vicariously, at
 least for a moment. With voyeuristic pleasure, Milly regards Kate "in the light of
 ... the identity she would have for Mr. Densher" (152). Through Kate, Milly expe
 riences Densher's loving gaze as if it were directed toward her: "Just so was how
 she [Kate] looked to him [Densher], andjust so was how Millywas held by her—
 held as by the strange sense of seeing through that distant person's eyes"
 (167-68). What greater evidence of her knowledge of their relationship could be
 offered than this gentle but purposeful acceptance of Densher's gaze as she imag
 ines herself "embodying" Kate?
 As Kate and Densher proceed with their plan, Milly apprehends their actions
 in such a way that their ethical duplicity may be both seen and overlooked,
 accepting a representation that serves her as much as it does her antagonists. Her
 belief in Kate and Densher is tested only to be reaffirmed when she discovers
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 them together in the National Gallery. Recognizing that their presence there
 together betrays an intimacy they have denied to her, she nonetheless accepts
 (albeit uncomfortably) the composition they present: "Merton Densher was in
 love, and Kate couldn't help it—could only be sorry and kind... she [Milly] tried
 it as a cover, tried it hard . . . pulled it over her . . . drew it up to her chin with
 energy" (194). In short, Milly continues to pursue the truth of her desire, to
 believe in Densher, knowing that this truth is as impossible as her own literal sur
 vival.41 In contrast to Kate's blind pursuit of completion through the socially
 sanctioned demands of Aunt Maud, and in contrast to Densher's struggle to imag
 ine his fulfilled desire in the space of its absence (the memory of Kate in his
 rooms), Milly consciously invests both Kate and Densher with meaning, know
 ing that her belief in them is, in large measure, her construction.
 Like Maggie Verver, who transforms herself from passive "doll" to Princess
 through her successive encounters with images constructed by Charlotte and
 Amerigo, Milly accepts the identity bestowed on her by others (such as Kate's
 benediction: "you're a dove" [ 184]), but her acceptance is far from a submission:
 "It was... like an inspiration: she found herself accepting as the right one, while
 she caught her breath with relief, the name so given her" (184). Milly's active
 adoption of the "dovelike" becomes a compositional strategy that gives her the
 strength to control what her antagonists see, and, in effect, to transform their
 understanding of her, and, ultimately, of themselves. Like the ironic "trophy"
 Milly carries away from Sir Luke Strett, Kate's benediction is another death knell,
 but it is one Milly transforms through her own special alchemy: "it lighted up the
 strange dusk in which she lately had walked" (184). In the role of the "dove," fully
 conscious that she is approaching the end of her journey, Milly brings her
 entourage to Venice, almost literally submerging them in her watery tomb. Her
 friendly antagonists agree to enact her fantasy (that she will be able to remain
 "aloft forever"; "never going down" [292]), and she agrees not to question them.
 When she takes possession of her palace, "the ark of her deluge" (289), Milly
 seems to accept the presence of death in a new way, announcing to Lord Mark, "I
 think I should like to die here" (295). And when Lord Mark offers her unspeci
 fied, but seemingly irrevocable proof that Kate and Densher are engaged, Milly's
 fantasy space is shattered and she must confront the void. But in a sense Lord
 Mark confirms something she already knows: that her desire is constructed
 around impossibility. As Milly "turns her face to the wall" (401), she reveals the
 "triumph of being for death," for, as Lacan explains, the tragic heroine shows us
 that access to desire "necessitates crossing not only all fear but all pity."42
 Milly transforms tragedy into triumph by offering Densher, on her deathbed,
 and beyond her death, the gift of love: she insists on her belief in him despite the
 evidence of his betrayal. As Kaja Silverman explains, glossing Lacan, to give some
 one "the active gift of love" means to idealize the other, "to confer ideality not to find
 it—but to do so knowingly, and without forgetting for a moment that he or she is
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 also a subject marked by lack."43 Milly's gift transforms Densher's desire into love
 and initiates Densher's movement from desire to love, as Lacan describes it: "Love
 is distinct from desire... because its aim is not satisfaction, but being."44 As she is
 dying, and after her death, Milly tacitly shows Densher how to understand his
 desire and his lack. She invites him to follow his desire to the place where it is
 empty, where he confronts her death and her loss: it is the place where pleasure
 becomes pain, what Lacan calls jouissance, and Densher experiences the paradox
 ical satisfaction of suffering.45 He is summoned for a final interview, suppressed in
 the text but one in which he feels he has been "forgiven, dedicated, blessed" (416).
 Milly's forgiveness is further confirmed by her letter, even though the contents of
 this letter are also suppressed. But Milly's letter will enable Densher—and even,
 reluctantly, Kate—to understand loss as the central feature of desire, and the nec
 essary condition for the emergence of subjectivity.
 VI
 "Instead of suggesting how we should live," Mitchell observes, James's novels
 invite us "to respond in pity, terror, exhilaration, sheer wonder at how far outside
 the normal bounds these characters are subjected."46 The ending of The Wings of
 the Dove offers nothing less than the kind of philosophical poetry we have been
 tracing, and the catharsis Mitchell describes from a reader's point of view may also
 be applied to James's characters' final struggle with desire, with self-knowledge,
 with ethical awareness. Tragedy reminds us of the need for a limit situation for
 the ethical subject to emerge,47 an Event that, as Badiou frames it, "compels the
 subject to invent a new way of being."48 Slowly, in closing scenes of the novel,
 the space of reflection and recognition, we witness, through the metaphorical
 embrace of Milly's "wings," and through the advent of her letter, the emergence
 of an ethic based on fidelity to one's desire.
 Thus far we have examined Kate's betrayal of her desire, her consistent priv
 ileging of the big Other, Densher's ethical crisis and partial transformation, and
 Milly's gift of love to her antagonists: her decision to believe in them with the
 knowledge of their betrayal. But in the final chapters James moves us to a more
 reflective place. In a sense the whole novel may be read as a movement from wait
 ing (Milly waits to die, Kate waits for the money, Densher waits to understand) to
 stillness to silence, and in the penultimate scenes James uses Densher to distill
 the significance of the action. While he is far from a tragic hero in a classical sense,
 James places the act of interpretation squarely on his shoulders, and his emerg
 ing understanding is imbued with a tragic sensibility as he registers error and
 guilt, waste and loss, and, finally, purification and love.
 When Densher returns to London, knowing Milly will soon die, he struggles
 to understand the two faces of desire; comparing what Kate and Milly offer him, he
 imagines his choices "as close as a pair of monsters he might have felt on either
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 cheek (422). He proceeds to construct two incompatible texts, one in which he
 and Kate are reunited; the other in which he lives with the memory of Milly. After a
 delay of three weeks, he meets with Kate and tells her that they must set aside all
 pretense and marry, that only this decisive act will make things right (419). ft is as
 if he hopes to overcome the split in his consciousness by acting according to his
 original desire.49 When Kate makes it clear, once again, that she will marry him only
 if he is certain they will inherit Milly's money, he begins to understand that he has
 never been the object of her desire, but what emerges in the novels final scenes is
 much more than Densher's recognition of his "wasted passion" (421).
 Beyond his guilt (which persists despite his projection ol blame onto Lord
 Mark and even his shabby treatment of Kate), beyond his awareness of the tragic
 waste of Milly's life, Densher discovers his connection to Milly in the most inti
 mate recesses of his being. His attitude toward his own desire undergoes its most
 radical transformation, and, ironically, it is Aunt Maud, once again, who holds up
 the mirror so that he may see himself—a mirror that now reflects the "truth" Den
 sher has lived. Recollecting his final interview with Milly, and reporting it to Aunt
 Maud, Densher sees himself in the eyes of the other, watches himself become the
 person he has created for Milly: "The young man, at these moments, so seen, was
 too distant and too strange, for the right identity; and yet outside, afterwards, it
 was his own face Densher had known" (416).50 Like Milly's adoption of the image
 of the dove as an emotional truth for her, Densher recognizes himself as Milly's
 lover. As he awaits the news of her death, he discovers that his love for Milly has
 become his "greatest reality" (412).51 Just as Hamlet discovers his desire (and his
 subjectivity) at Ophelia's grave because he experiences simultaneously his empti
 ness and his fullness through her loss (with the knowledge of the void upon
 which subjectivity rests), Densher, in contemplating the death of Milly, con
 fronts, for the first time, his own shattered subjectivity.52
 This confrontation is dramatized in what is perhaps the most poignant—and
 psychologically brutal—scene in the novel. Densher offers Kate Milly's unopened
 deathbed letter as his "sacrifice" in return for her visit to him in his rooms in Venice
 Jiis acknowledgment that she submitted to him without desire). But when Kate
 ;osses Milly's unopened letter into the fire, she unwittingly sets the stage for his most
 .mportant discovery: this irretrievable loss reveals to Densher the true nature of
 iesire.53 It is the letter of love that has been in plain sight all along, a love that now
 iccosts and holds Densher fast.34 Milly's gift of love, her letter and her bequest, illu
 minates her ethical fullness (her consistent commitment to her desire), and Den
 sher experiences her loss as something profoundly painful ("like the sacrifice of
 something sentient and throbbing" [451]) but at the same time transformative,
 something that fulfills a new kind of longing ("he kept it back like a favorite pang;
 eft it behind him, so to say when he went out, but came home again the sooner for
 :he certainty of finding it there" [450]).55 In this moment, Densher discovers his
 ibility to give: he becomes a "father, baffled and tender" to Milly, the "maimed child"
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 (450). He now stands in an authentic relationship to his desire, not because Milly
 now replaces Kate, thus making the lie he has lived true, but because her letter
 punches a hole in his established understanding: he begins to grasp the mysterious
 truth, that "there is nothing of significance that can fill the hole in the real."56 As
 Lacan explains it, "None of the symbolic objects we invest with meaning in order
 to 'gratify' our desire can ever be adequate"; the "work of mourning... is performed
 to satisfy the disorder that is produced by [this] inadequacy. "57 This powerful scene
 forwards Densher's movement toward ethical awareness: Milly has been elevated
 to the status of the permanently lost object, and even Kate understands the way
 Densher is altered by the Event of the lost letter. "You're afraid—it's wonderful!—
 to be in love with her" (455).
 In fact, Kate's deep intelligence permits one last ethical turn in the closing
 scene of the novel as she works to understand the choice Densher offers her.
 Accepting his claim that he was not in love with Milly while she was alive, she
 insists that he is now. When he asks her, finally, to choose (between him and
 Milly's money), she demands that he tell her he is not in love with Milly's mem
 ory: "don't speak as if you couldn't be. I could in your place; and you're one for
 whom it will do. Her memory's your love. You want no other" (456). Densher
 refuses to answer, and Kate, literally, has the last word ("We shall never be again
 as we were!" [457]). But if Milly's ethical stance has penetrated to the heart and
 transformed Densher's desire, it has also reached Kate. However self-serving Kate
 may sound in claiming that she and Densher have given Milly what she wanted,
 in the end it is she who truly understands Milly's point of view and her gift—that
 is, she understands the full dimension of Milly's fidelity to her desire: "She did it
 for us" (456). Kate articulates, in other words, what Densher only imagines, "the
 turn [Milly] would have given her act" (450) had they been able to read her let
 ter, which is to say, had they been able to understand the ethics of desire.
 In spite of Densher's complex straggle in the novel's closing scenes and his
 ultimate refusal to betray Milly—to swear to Kate that he is not in love with her
 memory—critics, on the whole, do not like him. It has been argued that in the
 end he fails to experience the self-examination that would imply a real conver
 sion, and that his morally weak core has not changed.58 On the level of conven
 tional ethics this may be true, but from the standpoint of an ethics of desire
 Densher has relinquished not only Kate but also the struggle for completion
 through her. He is no longer indentured to the will of others. And in his encounter
 with Milly's lost letter, he embraces her understanding of the necessary relation
 ship between desire and mortality. The ethical subject, in other words, must
 undergo a purging of specific "objects" of desire in order to encounter "the real
 Thing for which these objects are imaginary substitutes."59 This sudden insight
 into the abyss of Being gives way to a new kind of fidelity. It is a moment that
 invokes ethical behavior by calling the subject into being through what Badiou
 calls "the real process of fidelity to an event."60
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 And what of Milly's awareness or lack of awareness that she is being used? The
 notion that Milly is a naive victim who is ultimately destroyed by the "truth"—that
 is, her "discovery" of the real connection between Kate and Densher (through Lord
 Mark)—is difficult to reconcile with Milly's consistent awareness of that relation
 ship. While this does not lessen Kate's or Densher's responsibility, it does refocus
 the moral issue for Milly, who is neither naive nor a victim. Rather, she chooses to
 live with the knowledge that her desire for Densher, like her desire to live, is a
 construction—in defiance of the "facts," but necessary to her. Like Antigone, she
 chooses her desire, knowing it is impossible, knowing she will lose.61 In the novel's
 closing scenes, Milly's silence is more powerful than speech, reinforcing the uncon
 ditional nature of her gift. Although her letter has been destroyed, it has reached its
 destination, for it transforms her antagonists.62
 Milly dies, accepting the paradoxical truth that Kate and Densher have both
 been, and not been, what they seemed. Just as they have literally fulfilled her
 desire, she fulfills theirs in bequeathing Densher her money. Milly's Bronzino,
 embodying simultaneously her permanence and her transience, like her un
 opened letter, anticipates a structure of meaning that is fulfilled by Densher's final
 recognition of himself as a man in mourning, not only for Milly but for himself,
 a man who must remain permanently in a state of lack. In these final scenes,
 James's characters enact a direct confrontation with the myth of coherence that
 they have engendered in pursuing their desire. In place of the Enlightenment
 model of an ethic associated with higher reason, a refinement of the "self' (a self
 still, therefore, connected to what Badiou calls the "anarchic debris of circulating
 knowledge"),53 James anticipates a view of subjectivity (and implicitly an ethic)
 that can come into being only through a kind of madness—a recognition of the
 emptiness at the heart of being.
 Through their pursuit of the truth that their objects of desire mask, James's
 characters discover an "ethic of the Real"—what Badiou calls "the ethic of a truth."64
 In confronting permanent loss and universal lack, they experience, to different
 degrees, painful pleasure, preserving the authentic place of their jouissance even
 though the object of desire is empty.65 In this way they begin to retrieve an ethic
 from what appears to be a profoundly relativistic world of competing claims and
 designs. As Alenka Zupancic has suggested, Lacan's ethic of desire has much more
 in common with Kant's ethical demand that the individual act "for duty alone" than
 is generally recognized; she argues that in fact Kant and Lacan arrive at the same
 place. That is to say, the individual who pursues his or her desire to the end and
 comes to recognize that the object of desire is a substitute, something that blocks
 one's (impossible) awareness of the Real, is ultimately acting "for duty alone" or in
 Lacanian terms, for desire alone—stripped of its object.66 James's characters dis
 cover that the object of desire is the site of an imaginary blinding but also, poten
 tially, the site of ethical truth: a place where the "self' and all the symbolic desires it
 creates to assure its coherence must eventually be recognized as an illusion.
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 By discovering the truth of their desire James's characters also discover their
 own in-coherent selves, their shattered subjectivity. To return to James's image of
 Milly as a "Lorelei" who will see her antagonists "terrified and tempted and
 charmed; bribed away from more prescribed and natural orbits,"67 we see how
 Milly initially pulls Kate and Densher out of a more "natural" ethical path by
 tempting them with her money. But this passage may be read in an obverse way
 (to borrow James's image of the two-sided coin): in the end Milly invites her
 antagonists to abandon the "prescribed" path in order to understand the ethics of
 desire. Like Antigone, Milly stands for that purification of desire that is "central
 for access to any realization of oneself."68 She arrives at a place where her desire
 is dis-interested, and therefore ethical: it has been emptied of content, and her
 vulnerable gift of love is all that remains.69 Densher's poignant and loving con
 templation of her silence suggests that he, too, understands that Milly has suc
 cessfully altered his "orbit." At the end of The Wings of the Dove we witness
 Densher's fidelity to the Event of Milly Theale. We also note that Kate witnesses
 this Event: when she tells Densher he has fallen in love with Milly, admitting she
 would have done so, too, in his place, she speaks a different kind of truth from
 that which has guided her for most of the novel—it is a truth that contains the
 kernel of a new ethic. Through Milly's letter, which functions as a kind of resur
 rection, she insists on the truth that emerges through fidelity to one's desire. She
 demands that her antagonists recognize her subjectivity—and through it, their
 own. Milly's gift of love, embodied in her ethereal presence at the end of the novel
 (a silent but powerful siren song), is an image of ethical action.
 If poetry, as Badiou suggests, articulates our "essential disorientation . . .
 cutis] open a space within historical pathos,"70 it is also, thereby, an Event that
 "throws us outside of ourselves" and offers a "truth" that is not a "sense" but,
 rather, "a hole in sense."71 And it is Milly, in the moment of her final descent into
 her Venetian fortress, who most eloquently describes the status of the subject
 who lives "between two deaths,"72 who sees, as the tragic heroine always does,
 the strange and paradoxical envy of those (characters and readers) who bear wit
 ness to (but are excluded from) the purity of her ethical condition:
 She couldn't have said what it was, in the conditions, that renewed the
 whole solemnity, but... a kind of wistful hush had fallen upon them,
 as if before something poignant... That was nothing, verily, but the per
 fection of the charm—or nothing, rather, but their excluded, disinher
 ited state in the presence of it. The charm turned on them a face that was
 cold in its beauty, that was full of a poetry never to be theirs, that spoke,
 with an ironic smile, of a possible, but forbidden life.
 (292)
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